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It was reported earlier this week that French President
Emmanuel Macron suggested Europe should "build its own
military in order to protect itself from the US, China, and
Russia". This claim enraged American President Donald
Trump, who soon angrily tweeted “very insulting” as a response.
However, the latest news shows that Trump and Macron have
reached an agreement on Saturday involving issues of increasing
European defense spending and related security affairs. As
international public opinion suggested, this conduct is expected
to paper over the embarrassing trans-Atlantic dispute. But does it
really work?
Europe's Dream of Building an Autonomous Defense
Rome was not built in a day; it is the same with the trans-Atlantic
tension and resentment. This seemingly accidental event actually
has a much deeper root in the long history of trans-Atlantic
relations.
After World War II, the US rebuilt ruined Western Europe through
the Marshall Plan. Years later, the US military force integrated
Western European defense through the framework of NATO as a
strategic response to the escalating Cold War against the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
From then on, Western Europeans enjoyed the privilege of
“free-riding” in security that maintained a high level of
collective security at a relatively low cost.
However, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Saving military
expenditure under the US nuclear umbrella constrained the
strategic and political autonomy of Europeans.
When the two sides across the Atlantic Ocean shared the same
strategic goal in front of a common enemy, such as the Soviet
Union at the height of the Cold War, the impulse of defense
independence was covered.
But when the common foe collapsed and the Cold War ended, a
growing determination of military autonomy emerged; and the
EU, which aims to play a more provocative role in both global
and regional affairs, began to call for larger discourse power within
NATO.
If these demands aren't met, it is reasonable for European leaders
to call for a “real European army” to protect themselves from
external threat. This long evolving history constructed the deep
background of the Trump-Macron Twitter War.
Macron's 'Insult': The Beginning of a Bitter Trans-Atlantic
Divorce?
Before commemorations to mark the 100th anniversary of the end
of World War I, Macron welcomed Trump under “rainy Parisian
skies with a firm handshake…But there appeared to be less
immediate warmth in the greeting between the two than in the
past.”
CNBC's vivid description of the weather and meeting details
has set the atmosphere of this visibly reluctant reconciliation
performance: Seated on gilded chairs in the ornate
presidential palace, Macron placed his hand on Trump's knee
and referred to him as “my friend,” while Trump kept more
distance, although he also talked up common ground on an
issue that had caused friction.
However, beyond analyzing the ritual elements of this event,
it is still hard to predict an immediate “divorce” between
Europe and America. The process and interactive results may
depend on the two sides' costs-benefits calculation of various
“strategic asset portfolios,” as well as considering related
security and political risks.
For the EU, they have to make a choice between running a highly
independent and autonomous defensive system at a much higher
financial cost and maintaining the current collective security system
and regimes that enjoy economic benefits with the disadvantage
of bearing the American changing moods and bad temper.
Key internal and external elements that may change
European strategists' calculations include but are not limited to:
(1) Trump's bargain and “price making”: To what extent of
the portion that Trump urges the EU to bear NATO's military
expenditure;
(2) US “threat”: In the EU's perspective, the US does not pose
an actual direct military threat (such as invasion, territorial
annexation, etc.); however, the Trump administration's
abuse of the US' arbitrary power has insulted and
weakened the EU's collective sovereignty as a whole.
And the US military's adventurism and consequent military
catastrophes in regions around Europe (such as the Middle
East) have created a lot of (non- traditional) security and
social problems for Europeans, including but not limited
to refugees, terrorism, social division, the reactive trend of
rising far- right parties in EU member states, and so forth.
(3) Third-party threat: When the threat from a third party
(e.g. Russia) decreases (in other words, their bilateral relations
are promoted), there will be less necessity for the EU to
enhance its defensive force, and hence, less motive and
demand for expenditure.
Therefore, the EU may be satisfied with a new option that
maintains a smaller but more independent-autonomous
defensive system. This situation requires a general
reconciliation between the EU and the targeted “third party,”
which may serve to cripple the US military existence in Europe.
What option will US and EU leaders choose eventually?
Where is this nearly a-century-long trans-Atlantic
“marriage” going in a Trump era of uncertainty? May bitter
time and tougher bargains tell the story.
Copy Editor/ Kang Sijun
Editor/Kang Sijun
来源:察哈尔学会
WANG Peng